Crime, Terror, and Local Politics in Karachi
On June 29, 2020, four members of the Baloch Liberation Army (Majid Brigade) attacked the offices of Karachi Stock Exchange. Seven people died, including the four attackers, two security guards and a policeman. It came at the heels of multiple low-intensity attacks in Sindh weeks earlier that claimed the lives of two soldiers and a retired paramilitary official. The Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army, a separatist organization, banned by the government claimed responsibility. Security officials (including from the paramilitary forces and Karachi police) credited intelligence agencies of neighboring India behind a seeming alliance among the Sindhi and Balochi separatist groups, and the London-based members of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM). For reference, the latter, which was once hailed as the largest political party of Karachi with immense power has been weakened since the military operation in Karachi that began in 2015.
Invariably, conversations about Karachi are shaped through the language of law and order in Pakistan. For good reason too—political parties have been involved in supporting organized crime groups as well as engaged in extortion and murder according to journalistic accounts and scholarship. The recently declassified report by the Sindh government on one of the most known gangsters of Karachi as well as a report on an entire factory building set on fire by members of a political party, which killed atleast 259 people provide damning evidence. At the same time, violence perpetrated by state forces in pursuit of restoring law and order is also documented.
While statistics related to the number of killings, robberies, extortions, and kidnappings etc. suggest that militarized responses are effective, they do not remain so for long. The city’s landscape evolves and players adapt in response, lending to even more complexity. For instance, in the latest spate of events, security officials themselves point to possible linkages among players that have a history of being at the opposing ends of the political spectrum. These include separatist fringe groups as well as a breakaway faction of a mainstream political party. It was only a few years ago that the latter had formed local government in the city and that continues to have members in Parliament.
Mausoleum of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Karachi (Photo by Hassan Anwer on Unsplash)
It is tempting to place the blame squarely on corruption and ineptitude of political players in Karachi as well as the excesses of militarized responses to the complexity of the city’s political economy. It is more useful to point out that the approach of locating causality behind the recent attack in proximate factors is wanting. It presents an apolitical reading of political challenges.
Even if such attacks are countered swiftly, they are no fix to challenges shaped by broader dynamics of political, economic and social grievances, and governance. These are power-laden questions—who speaks for whom? how are resources being distributed and among whom? What of invisible and actual geographies of violence in the form of no-go zones, or enclaves of one political player or the other? How are divisions along ethnic and religious identities employed by political players of all types to carve constituencies of support and influence? How does one, especially, if not living in a gated community, get access to basic amenities necessary for living? How does one “de-politicize” government departments including local law enforcement officials? More importantly, how are these pre-existing social and political dynamics interacting with emergent climate-related risks or water shortages?
While there are no easy answers, one may argue that alternative approaches are needed. Developing a granular understanding of neighborhoods, relations and interactions among various types of players, and how they are connected to players in the formal realm, and mapping patterns over time and space may be one way forward. This entails paying attention to bottom-up strategies by ordinary people as well as by middle-level players engaging in service provision. Not to mention that people may operate in “formal” and “informal” spheres at the same time, or navigate with considerable ease. Such an approach may help to develop a high-resolution picture of the social, political and economic interactions and relations among multiple players that play a key role in the governance and politics of the city.
There is promise in developing an understanding of ground realities beyond the confines of law and order. The latter may provide respite for some time but “peace” never lasts for long. Simply, the people of Karachi need to be at the heart of policy discussions about Karachi.
